For nearly two decades, the group of emerging-market countries increased its holdings of liquid foreign exchange reserves, both in dollar terms and relative to domestic income levels. That trend accelerated in the early 2000s, but it may be ending now as the emerging economies struggle in the backwash of the global financial crisis and economic slowdown. In the mid-2000s, liquidity was abundant in the world economy, but recently there has been an acute global shortage of dollar liquidity. Recent declines in emerging market international reserves are directly related to this shortage. Before the recent crisis, commentary on the emerging-market reserve buildup focused on the possibility that reserve stocks might have reached "excessive" levels.
Certainly some countries' reserve levels far exceeded the levels needed to counter fluctuations in export earnings, and often even covered the possibility that short-term 1 The Russian situation was exacerbated by noneconomic fundamentals (political risk), most notably following the invasion of Georgia in August 2008. The Russian data are also obfuscated by occasional replenishments of the central bank's reserves by drawing from the country's Sovereign Wealth Fund. The fungibility of central bank and SWF assets, and the rapidly growing size of SWF hoards, will likely complicate measurement even further in future.
external debts might not be rolled over (the so-called "Guidotti-Greenspan" prescription for reserve adequacy). Economic analysis of optimal reserve levels has a long history, going back at least to the writing of Henry Thornton (1939) at the start of the nineteenth century. In recent work, we have followed Thornton's lead, arguing that governmentsespecially those of emerging markets-view reserves as protection against "doubledrain" crisis scenarios in which banking and currency problems interact in ways likely to cause sharp and disruptive external currency depreciation.
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In a specific crisis scenario, investor fear of currency depreciation leads to a run out of domestic deposits, pressuring banks and triggering lender-of-last resort liquidity (LLR) provision by the monetary authorities. This LLR support, however, magnifies the potential claims on official foreign exchange reserves, and hence magnifies the currency depreciation that results when the reserves are expended to support the exchange rate. It follows that reserve levels may have to be quite large if the banking system is highly developed and the government hopes to resist sharp currency depreciation in a potential crisis. Official fear of abrupt depreciation may be due to dollarized financial liabilities, rapid pass-through to inflation, or other factors discussed in the "fear of floating"
literature.
The utility of foreign exchange reserves is well articulated by the International
Monetary Fund (2008, p. 37) in a recent overview of the current crisis: "[I]n the face of sharp capital outflows, countries will need to respond quickly to ensure adequate liquidity and deal with emerging problems in weaker institutions. The exchange rate should be 2 See Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor (2008) . Similar theoretical ideas have been discussed in the crisis literature, for example by Guillermo A. Calvo (1996 Calvo ( , 2006 , Calvo and Enrique G. Mendoza (1996) , Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco (2001) , Jeffrey D. Sachs (1998), and Velasco (1987) . Jeanne (2007) surveys recent commentary and analysis regarding emerging-market reserves.
allowed to absorb some of the pressure, but stockpiles of reserves provide room for intervention to avoid disorderly market conditions."
I. Financial Stability and Reserves in the Data
In Obstfeld et al. (2008) we argue that a considerable share of the reserve accumulation in recent years can be explained as an attempt by central banks to insure against this sort of financial instability. Importantly, the financial shock we consider is not simply a "sudden stop", in which case countries would need to hold reserves only in proportion to their short term external debt. Rather, internal sources of financial instability also can be critical. As a result, when a country has open financial markets and desires exchange rate stability, it needs to hold reserves proportional to the size of its banking system.
Specifically, we show that the reserves/GDP ratio is a function of financial openness, the exchange rate regime and monetary depth (M2/GDP ratio). Despite the focus on the "Guidotti-Greenspan" rule and sudden stops in the literature, short term external debt is not a significant predictor of reserve holdings, though another variable often considered in more traditional models, the Trade/GDP ratio is. 3 Thus, a specification like that in Table 1 , Column 1, which combines our basic "financial stability" variables with Trade/GDP does a good job of explaining reserve behavior. 4 We 3 For a review of the recent empirical literature, see Obstfeld et al (2008) . Robert Flood and Nancy Marion (2002) have connected reserve holdings to a buffer stock model, Joshua Aizenman and Marion (2003) have argued the buildup of reserves in East Asia can be seen as precautionary savings, and Aizenman and Jaewoo Lee (2007) argue that precautionary not mercantilist reasons can explain the reserves buildup.
Relative to these papers, we focus more on the size of the domestic financial system as opposed to fear of sudden stops. 4 The model is estimated in natural logs and standard errors are clustered at the country level to correct for both heteroskedasticity across countries and serial correlation within countries. We use WDI data for reserves, GDP, and M2. The Financial openness measure is from Edwards (2007) , the exchange rate classification is based on Shambaugh (2004) , and the measure of "original sin" is from Barry Eichengreen et al. (2005) and is based on BIS issuance data. See Obstfeld et al. (2008) for details on data and sample.
see that the coefficients on financial openness, monetary depth, and trade all have expected signs and are significantly different from zero at 99%. A "soft peg" measure is also positive and significant at 99% while a direct peg is not (though the two are not statistically significantly different). The regressions are in logs, so a 10% increase in the M2/GDP ratio is correlated with a 3% increase in the reserves to GDP ratio. Financial openness is scaled between 0 and 1 (based on the measure proposed by Sebastian
Edwards 2007) and the exchange-rate regime variables are dummies.
In the Emerging Market sample (EM), where much of the puzzle over recent behavior lies, a specification like this explains a substantial portion of reserve/GDP variation, both over time for one country (in panel estimations with country fixed effects) and across countries (in cross-sections or in panels with year fixed effects). Column 2 shows the basic EM sample regression. The coefficients on financial openness and monetary depth are even larger, as is the explanatory power of the regression. The R 2 is now as high as 0.6. Differences in exchange rate regimes are not significant in the EMonly sample.
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Financial depth is even more important in the last 15 years since the expansion of financial globalization. In Column 3 we show the specification for 1993-2005 for all countries. 6 Here the coefficient on financial depth has increased such that a 10% increase in M2/GDP comes with a 5% increase in reserves/GDP. The coefficient on trade 5 As we note in our previous work, many of the emerging market countries flip back and forth across exchange rate regimes and even when not pegging may intend to peg soon. See Michael W. Klein and Shambaugh (2008) . 6 As noted below, we will also include a measure of the ability to issue debt externally in local currency. This measure is not available until 1993, so we limit ourselves to that sample here. In Obstfeld et al. (2008) we show that a post 1990 sample that is not limited by "sin" data availability also looks like the regression shown here.
openness has declined some. Financial openness is less significant in this sample. There is less variation within country in this shorter sample so some precision is lost.
One other factor that is consistently significant is a dummy for the advanced countries (AD). These countries hold fewer reserves than their M2/GDP, Trade/GDP, exchange rate regime and financial openness suggest they should. This is true even when we control for the ability to issue debt in ones' own currency, or "original sin." Column 4
shows this regression. The sin variable-which varies from 0 (little foreign currency debt issued) to 1 (all external debt is in foreign currency, none local) has a significant and positive coefficient. Going from all local currency debt to all foreign currency debt would double reserve holdings.
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In this paper, rather than focusing entirely on the EM sample (as in our previous work) we now include AD countries. While the puzzle of reserve buildup was primarily an EM issue, the current crisis is one that clearly touches both EM and AD countries.
Thus, in our predictive work below will be limited to that sample, for which column 5
shows the corresponding results for our preferred benchmark regression with only financial variables. exclude an influential extreme outlier-the infamous case of Iceland. In Columns 2 through 5, which unlike Column 1 exclude Iceland, the relationship between low reserves and high depreciation is clear. Actual relative to predicted reserves is significant at the 1% level in the full and AD samples, and the 10% level in the more noisy EM sample. In
II. Implications for Today
Column 6 this result is again robust to the inclusion of the lagged current account surplus to GDP ratio, which is once more statistically insignificant (though of the expected sign).
As a convenient graphical summary of our argument, we present a scatter plot of actual depreciation in 2008 versus our model's actual/predicted reserve ratio for the AD & EM sample. This is shown in Figure 2b , with Iceland excluded from the line of best fit, as in Column 2. Excluding the bizarre case of Iceland, the results are quite striking:
international reserves did provide effective insurance against currency instability, for both advanced and emerging countries alike.
IV. Central Bank Currency Swaps in the Panic of 2008
This crisis has also generated one of the most notable examples of central bank cooperation in history-the large swap lines set up between a number of central banks. Table 3 , for swap recipients, we show actual and predicted reserves/GDP as well as actual reserves in dollars, the gap in our model between actual to predicted (in dollars), and the size of the initial swap lines themselves.
The swaps were clearly large in magnitude for many advanced countries. For every advanced country except Japan, the size of the swap exceeded 50% of actual reserves held and in the case of the U.K., Australia, and the ECB, the swap was larger than the existing level of reserves. 16 In addition, for a number of countries, such as Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand, not only was the swap line nearly as big as existing reserves, but it was larger than the gap with our model's prediction. On the other hand, in some cases, the swap line was too small to plug the gap relative to predicted reserves.
15 See Fender and Gyntelberg (2008) for a discussion of the swap lines. Data for the size of the swaps is taken from there. Swaps that were eventually increased to infinity are listed in the table at the largest amount prior to that increase and are noted in the table. 16 Detailed information on reserves on the Bank of England website shows currency composition of reserves and this reveals that the BoE holdings of US dollars was much smaller than the total reserves and by the time the swap line was instituted, the BoE was down to less than $10 billion in US dollar reserves.
Australia, Canada and the U.K. all still have fewer reserves than expected even counting the swap (and not counting the decline in their reserves in 2008 so far).
In contrast, the swaps to emerging countries are never larger than 50% of their actual reserves. Further, in most cases, the country already had more reserves than predicted. Korea's was $30 billion, though the country already had $260 billion. For
Singapore the figure was, $30 billion against $162 billion already held, and Brazil received $30 billion versus $180 billion on hand. It is hard to see how these magnitudes could be very meaningful; all three countries already held more reserves than predicted by our model. Instead, these swap lines could be interpreted as signals. For Mexico and Hungary, the swaps are more substantial relative to actual reserves and those two countries were holding fewer reserves than predicted, so the swap lines may have had a more substantive impact beyond mere signaling in those cases.
This way of looking at the swaps demonstrates a number of important issues in the current international monetary system. Even with nearly a trillion dollars committed, in some cases the Fed's action was primarily symbolic because the foreign country already had so many dollars. In other cases, the swap may have been quite important, but the scale required to for effective lending is not available to organizations such as the IMF or other multilateral agencies. Only the world's largest central banks can intervene on such a scale. Some players (such as China and India) do have foreign reserves sufficient to allow them to act as crisis lenders to foreign governments, but so far such actions have been limited, including Nordic central banks lending euros to Iceland and Japan's offer of $100 billion in resources to the IMF.
The swap lines also have implications for reserve holdings. One could argue that the expectation that such swap lines could be available rationalizes advanced countries' decisions to hold fewer reserves than other countries. This would suggest EM countries will continue to hold large reserves until they are confident that they will have access to substantial foreign exchange swaps when in need. Alternatively, these extraordinary measures may have been just that-extraordinary. The advanced countries may now recognize this and increase their reserve stocks (or in some cases adopt the euro to reduce the need for reserves). An increase in IMF resources could also be in the cards.
V. Conclusion
International reserves are in some ways the ultimate rainy day fund for a country. They are hard, liquid assets that have value in times of need. The Panic of 2008 is more than a rainy day: it is a torrential downpour. Elsewhere we have argued that reserve holdings are strongly connected to the size of the banking system. Countries insure not just against an end of foreign financial inflows, but also against runs on the currency by domestic savers.
Here we show that interpreting reserve holdings in this manner is helpful for understanding reserve adequacy and countries' seemingly different abilities to weather the current storm.
Currencies of countries holding more reserves relative to M2-and in particular, more reserves relative to our measure of predicted reserves based on financial motiveshave tended to appreciate in the crisis. Those of countries with smaller war chests have depreciated. Understanding these motives for reserve demand also shows that central bank swap lines to some smaller advanced countries have been sizable as a share of 
